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ABSTRACT
In September 2006 the European Council decided to repeal
Regulation 4056/86 with effect from October 2008. The
primary issue addressed in this study is the impact of repeal
of block exemption in Europe on two major Europe-based
trades – the United States/North Europe trade and the Far
East/North Europe trade. This paper measures empirically the
economic impact of the repeal of conference on competition of
EU liner shipping. Adam Smith’s theory of joint products is
adopted to examine the impact of the repeal after 2009. This
paper considers head haul and backhaul container shipments
as joint products. Two statistical equations are employed to
reinterpret Smith’s condition of joint products. Analysis results using available information from 2010 through 2012
reveal that the EU’s repeal of conference produced a striking
difference in how carriers react to deregulation reform in the
two major Europe-based trade lanes.

I. INTRODUCTION
The belief that liner conferences were instrumental to the
needs of international commerce was established among economic (and legal) scholars since the early years of the United
States (US) antitrust doctrine, and had become almost a dogma.
This dogma established that liner shipping companies must
not be subject to cartel prohibitions, since price competition
would have undermined the stability of maritime trades
(Munari, 2009). In a similar manner, in the European Union
(EU), the rules on competition are contained in Articles 81 and
82 of the European Community Treaty and the liner shipping
industry is granted a block exemption for agreements under
European Council Regulation 4056/86 in effect since July
1987. Liner conferences basically fix prices and regulate
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supplies and have enjoyed anti-trust immunity under both the
US and the EU jurisdictions (Marlow and Nair, 2008).
Arguments in support of the antitrust exemption take a variety of forms, but their gravamen is that special cost and
capacity problems of liner shipping make it impossible for
the industry to arrive at efficient levels of supply, and that
unbridled competition will lead to destructive competition,
instability of prices, and undesirable oligopoly (Sagers, 2006).
Meanwhile, carriers agreed unanimously that without collective rate setting, destructive competition will lead to unstable
prices.
Historically, the block exemption was justified on the assumption “that conferences bring stability, ensuring exporters
reliable services which cannot be achieved by less restrictive
means” (FMC, 2012). However, US trades experienced a
markedly changed business environment after Ocean Shipping
Reform Act (OSRA) 1998 went into effect. Responding to the
challenges of this new environment, in March 2003, the European Commission (EC) initiated a review of the liner conference block exemption. The review’s main objective was to
ascertain whether the policy assumptions supporting the original exemption in 1986 were still valid. Following a number of
European court cases challenging how the block exemption
was to be interpreted, the Directorate General for Competition
(DG Comp) eventually came to the view that the liner shipping
industry had changed considerably since 1986 and the block
exemption was overdue for review. DG Comp proposes to end
the block exemption, and argues that liner conferences in the
EU trades no longer fulfilled the original conditions for the
block exemption (FMC, 2012).
In September 2006, the European Council decided to repeal
Regulation 4056/86 with effect from October 2008. The recitals of Regulation 1419/2006 provide expressly ample reasons to justify the removal of the block exemption. Detailed
reasons are provided to explain why none of the four conditions precedent under the EC Treaty, Article 81.3 is satisfied,
and therefore why no exemption from cartel prohibition can
be obtained for agreement on fixing rates or allocating capacity among ship owners (Munari, 2009). The repeal impacted directly these EU-based shipping trades by eliminating
all forms of conference and price-fixing agreements between
ocean carriers. Consequently, Trans-Atlantic Conference
Agreement (TACA), which operated in North Europe/US
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trade, was terminated, as was the Far East Freight Conference
(FEFC), which operated in Far East/North Europe trade.
The repeal of Regulation 4056/86 was a significant development in the maritime sector. Any form of cooperation between carriers that are part of conferences operating on EU
routes is now subject to normal competition rules unless the
criteria of the Consortia Block Exemption are met. In particular, any fixing of prices or exchange of commercially
sensitive information is treated as a ‘hard-core’ restriction and
the consequences of entering into such restrictive agreements
can result in a fine of up to 10% of group annual turnover as
well as ongoing fines (Harwood, 2012).
Between July 1987 and Oct. 2008, Regulation 4056/86 provided liner conferences operating on EU routes with a specific
block exemption from Article 81. Normal and effective competition in liner shipping sector did not seem to exist prior to
the repeal. However, after the repeal of conference, the shipping industry should move on and embrace a new procompetition paradigm where market efficiency, innovation and
competitiveness is determined by free and fair competition in
the provision of liner shipping services. Thus, observing the
industry’s behavior after EU’s repeal provides an excellent
opportunity to test the predictive accuracy of the competitive
market mechanism.
The market structure of both US/North Europe trade and
Far East/North Europe trade were examined to see if these
markets are competitive subsequent to the repeal of Regulation 4056/86. In this paper, head haul and backhaul routes of
both trade lanes were taken as joint products. Two statistical
equations were employed to examine the structure of EU’s
liner shipping market. Statistics data were split into two sectors: North America/Europe and Far East/Europe trade, because of their substantially different market structures. OLS
test conducted on the price series of both trade routes yielded
mixed results.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature review is divided into two parts. First, we
review the literature on the topic of the repeal of Regulation
4056/86, and then introduce the literature on joint products.
1. Literature on Repeal of Regulation
Shipping policy has been dramatically redesigned in the
past several years, mainly by way of OSRA. OSRA’s first
steps towards deregulation and the introduction of price competition through confidential, individual service contracts have
hastened the virtual demise of the conference system in less
than 10 years (Sagers, 2006). In response to the changing
global shipping environment, several studies were conducted
to investigate the possibility and the effect of removing the
exemption.
OECD (1976) observed that liner industry had failed to
demonstrate that price fixing was indispensable to regular,
efficient and sustainable shipping services. Thus, it recom-

mended to “Member countries, when reviewing the application policy in the liner shipping sector, to seriously consider
removing anti-trust exemptions for price fixing and rate discussions” (Munari, 2009).
Following a number of European court cases challenging
how the block exemption was to be interpreted, the DG Comp
came to the view that the liner shipping industry had changed
considerably since 1986 and the block exemption was overdue
for review. In March 2003, the EC initiated a review (FMC,
2012) of the liner conference block exemption. The review’s
main objective was to ascertain whether the policy assumptions supporting the original exemption in 1986 were still
valid. It concluded that liner conferences in the EU trades no
longer fulfilled the original conditions for the block exemption
(Stragier, 2004). The review resulted in the repeal of the block
exemption. This DG Comp’s claim is reevaluated by Munari
(2009).
Munari (2009) examined the origins and the rationale of the
EC antitrust immunity granted to the shipping industry and
explained the causes of this historical change. He assessed the
new EC regime on agreements restricting competition in the
liner shipping industry. Munari’s study also raised the concern
about the effects of the repeal on trades with third countries.
He pointed out the need for further investigation on those
trades between Member States parties abiding the UN Code of
Conduct and third countries adhering to the UN Convention.
Munari believed that the Member States affected might well
encounter difficulties in justifying their conduct vis-à-vis the
third country.
The Federal Maritime Commission (FMC, 2012) has published its report on the EU’s repeal of conference. The report
was launched to see whether the EU’s repeal might cause
freight rate reductions in EU liner trades in comparison with
its US counterpart by looking at changes in container rates
from 2008 to 2011 in the Transatlantic, Asia-Europe and
Transpacific trade lanes. FMC concluded that “the repeal of
the block exemption does not appear to have resulted in any
negative impact on US liner trades” through 2010. However,
FMC’s study was criticized by the European Shipper Council
(American Shipper, 2012b) that: “The FMC seems to have
underestimated some of the market differences between the
Asia-Europe trades and those of the Asia-Pacific.”
During the course of October 2009, a number of important
liner trades within the jurisdiction of the EU exhibited a range
of activities that raised concerns that some form of parallel
conduct might have been the cause of capacity withdrawals
and price increases. These concerns were reinforced when on
17 May 2011 the EC announced that it had conducted ‘dawn
raids’ at the premises of 12 shipping lines within the EU. EC
disclosed that their investigations would be centered on potential violations of antitrust law including the co-ordination
of prices and/or liner transport capacity to and from the EU
and the Far East Asia (Harwood, 2012).
In light of these alleged collusions, Global Shippers (2011)
pointed out that European competition regulation had moved
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on to compliance and enforcement of the repeal. The implementation of competition policy in tandem with deregulation
provides an essential framework that encourages market discipline, promotes economic efficiency and eliminates anticompetitive behavior and other market distorting influences.
2. Literature on Smith’s Condition of Joint Products
The classic case of joint supply – wherein two products
such as beef and hide are gotten from each animal – is the
foundation for a number of theoretical adaptations of important cases of real-world supply and demand. Ekelund and
Thompson (2001) reviewed the evolution of joint supply theory from early Smith-Mill-Marshall construction to today’s
peak load pricing theory and traced them over the course of
two centuries where the variety of joint supply includes joint
products, backhauls, peak load pricing and some aspects of
public goods. After reviewing various models related to joint
supply theory, they pointed out the differences existing among
microeconomics models of joint products, public goods and
price discrimination.
In reviewing Smith’s contribution, Ekelund and Thompson
(2001) found that Smith examined the presence of joint
products from the market side instead of the production side
and proposed: “Equilibrium requires that the price of all joint
products at least cover the total cost of production; in a competitive market, of course, the summed prices and the cost
would be equal. Ceteris paribus, the prices of the joint products will be inversely related. If the price of meat falls, the
price of hides must increase enough to again cover the cost of
the animal.” In 1904, Smith set two conditions for the presence of competitive equilibrium of joint supply. They are: (1)
assuming individual goods to be produced in constant proportions, and that an increase in the demand for one good
(hides/meat) must reduce the price of the other (meat/hides);
and (2) in equilibrium, the summed prices and the cost must be
equal. Competitive equilibrium of joint supply exists when
these two conditions are met.
Bell (1968) found that the decree by Pope Paul VI to allow
Catholics to eat meat on Fridays had a negative influence on
fish prices which had become one of the most familiar illustrations of the demand theory. Thornton (1992) also found
that the increase in the demand for beef resulting from the
Pope’s decree was indeed accompanied by a noticeable increase in the quantity of cowhides, which was jointly supplied
with beef through the cattle production. However, Thornton’s
study did not provide enough pricing evidence to fulfill
Smith’s condition of joint products.
Mixon and Green (2002) also explained the predicted impact of the Pope’s decision on the market for red and white
wine. Two panels were issued to explain that the decision
made by Catholic Bishops in the U.S. to terminate obligatory
meatless Fridays would have led many consumers to substitute
beef for fish on many of the 46 non-Lent Fridays. They concluded that this would have predictably led to an increase
(decrease) in the demand for red (white) wine. However, no
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empirical test was conducted by Mixon and Green.
The issue of “backhaul problem” could be dated back to the
1840s when engineers studied railway pricing problem. Following the discussion of backhaul problem existing in early
railway literature, Ekelund and Thompson (2001) pointed out,
“If the movement of freight or passengers from A to B necessarily and in fixed proportion required a movement from B to A,
the actual activity was intertemporal. The movement was, in
effect, time dated and constituted two distinct services with
two demand curves, DAB and DBA. The result, dubbed “time
jointness” by early writers, was, of course, to be called peak
load pricing by the mid-twentieth century.” In the 1950s, the
theory of peak load pricing, which was developed by Steiner
(1957) and Williamson (1966), focused on developing a general rule for pricing a public utility’s service subject to periodic
demand.
In the literature on transport, the joint cost phenomenon is
known as the backhaul problem (Felton, 1981). One area to
which the principle of efficient pricing has been applied is the
pricing of backhaul. Kahn (1970) showed the determination
of forward and backhaul truck rates in a purely competitive
market under different relative demands for forwards and
backhauls. By assuming the backhaul quantity to be smaller
than the forward quantity, he concluded that all joint costs
would be borne by the forward shippers, while the backhaul
shippers will pay only the separable, i.e., marginal, loaded
backhaul costs. Felton (1981) demonstrated that making
transport rates direction-dependent affects positively total
welfare in the context of perfect competition. He concluded
that high and inflexible backhaul rates are the consequence of
rate regulation. The elimination of rate controls should improve utilization by promoting peak-load pricing and discouraging non-price competition. Davies (1987) thought that
a peak load pricing policy might promote efficient allocation
of shipping capacity. However, no empirical study had been
performed to substantiate the suggested pricing theory mentioned in his articles.
Boyer (1997) studied the market competition and backhaul
pricing problem and showed that competitive pressures will
ensure efficient cost allocation for making a round trip between the front-haul and the backhaul. Although Boyer had
not conducted any empirical study on the subject of backhaul
pricing, he did compare the difference in freight rates between
Transpacific eastbound and westbound trade routes. Boyer
(1997) found “The fact that the price differential is not even
larger is perhaps a reflection of the fact that competition is not
completely free on the route, but governed partly by a legal
cartel.” Rietveld and Roson (2002) also regarded the backhaul
problem as a phenomenon of joint cost in their study of public
transport.
Ferguson (1972) developed a model to examine the routeby-route actual and estimated forward haul rates for the
transport of wool in Australia in 1970 and found that forward
and backhaul rates put together would approximate the sum of
separable and joint costs. Under the assumption of perfect
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Fig. 1. Determination of head haul and backhaul freight rates.

competition, Jonkeren et al. (2011) also applied a joint pricing
equation to the backhaul pricing problem and concluded that
imbalances in trade flows affect substantially transport traffic
service prices. In contrast to the studies of Jonkeren et al.
(2011) and Ferguson (1972), this research is explicitly designed to elucidate Smith’s condition of joint products; i.e.,
in a competitive equilibrium, head haul and backhaul transport
prices will move in opposite directions, and the summed prices
equal the cost. To examine whether the EU’s liner market is
competitive, pairs of homebound and outbound freight rates
are collected from both North America/Europe and Far East/
Europe trade (Containerisation International online, 2013).

III. THEORETICAL MODEL
According to the theory of joint products, the competitive
market will automatically allocate a higher proportion of
freight rates to the head haul route and a smaller proportion to
the backhaul route. As shown in Fig. 1, the horizontal axis
measures the number of round trips made during a year by
container ships, while the vertical axis measures the prices
where Prt represents the prices for a round trip as well as Pij and
Pji represent the two individual one-way trips (Hoffmann and
Kumar, 2010). The two demand curves shown are for the use
of a ship to carry containers for head haul (Dij) and backhaul
(Dji). Drt, representing the combined demand for a ship’s
round trips, is derived by summing Dij and Dji vertically, since
the consumption of head haul and backhaul are non-competing.
The combined demand curve (Drt) has a kink corresponding to
the number of voyages for container shipment under no charge
(Demirel et al., 2010) for using the ship in the backhaul
shipment. The specific number of voyages at zero price is
shown as Q** in Fig. 1. If the number of voyages is smaller
than Q**, both head haul and backhaul shippers are willing to
pay a positive price to use the ship. The combined demand

Q* Q1
Number of round trips
Fig. 2. Increase in demand for head haul shipments.

curve (Drt), shown as a bold line, is steeper than either of the
directional demand curves since it represents changes in the
combined willingness of head haul and backhaul shippers to
pay with changes in the number of voyages.
In Fig. 1, the positive slope line, S, shows the supply curve
of round-trip voyages. In equilibrium, the number of voyages
is presented as Q*, which is the quantity equating a ship’s demand and supply. Pij is the price paid by the shipper for head
haul shipment (Dij), whereas Pji is the price charged for backhaul shipment (Dji). In a competitive market, this sharing of the
costs of a head haul and backhaul trip balances exactly the
revenue (Prt) obtained from head haul and backhaul shippers.
In the theory of Smith’s condition of joint products, two
transport prices (Pij and Pji) move in opposite directions as
shown by dashed lines in Fig. 2. For instance, an increase in
the demand for head haul trips will shift the demand curve to
Dij1, which results in the combined demand for a ship’s round
trips Drt shift to Drt1. As the freight rate of a round-trip shipment rises to Prt1, the freight rate of head haul trip rises to Pij1,
while that of backhaul voyage falls to Pji1. To accommodate
the increase in demand for head haul trips with more voyages
traveled, the freight rate of backhaul voyage must fall because
there was no increase in demand for backhaul trips, only an
increase in quantity demanded of backhaul shipment (from
point A to point B).
Algebraically, the equilibrium condition can be summed as
follows:
Pij + Pji = LRAC or
Pji = a + (-1)* Pij

(1)

where LRAC is the long-run average cost of providing the
“bundle” of services ij and ji.
The focus of this algebra equation is on testing whether
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Table 1. Container cargo flows on major East-West container trade routes.
Transpacific
Far East/
North America/
North America
Far East
1995
3.97
3.54
1996
3.99
3.65
1997
4.57
3.46
1998
5.39
2.86
1999
6.11
2.92
2000
7.31
3.53
2001
7.43
3.40
2002
8.35
3.37
2003
9.00
3.61
2004
10.58
4.09
2005
11.89
4.48
2006
13.16
4.71
2007
13.54
5.30
2008
12.90
6.38
2009
10.62
6.12
2010
12.80
6.00
2011
12.70
6.00
Sources: Review of Maritime Transport 2011-2012.
Year

Europe Asia
Far East/
Erope/
Europe
Far East
2.40
2.02
2.61
2.21
2.96
2.32
3.58
2.10
3.90
2.34
4.65
2.46
4.71
2.47
5.11
2.64
6.87
3.76
8.17
4.30
9.33
4.42
11.22
4.46
12.98
4.97
13.31
5.24
11.36
5.46
13.50
5.60
14.10
6.20

there is a statistically significant linear inverse relationship
between the freight rates of head haul and backhaul container
shipments in Europe. That is in a competitive market if Pij
falls, Pji must increase enough to cover the LRAC. Statistically, the most interesting parameter in the above linear equation is to test if the value of the slope of the above regression
line is equal to (-1).
Graphically, the shifting of joint demand curve from Drt to
Drt1 indicates a nonlinear inverse relationship between the
freight rates of head haul and backhaul container shipments in
Europe. That is in a competitive market if Pij falls, Pji must
increase. Statistically, the most interesting parameter in the
above linear equation is to test if the value of the slope of the
above regression line is negative.
Accordingly, the competitive equilibrium condition of
Smith’s joint products can be summed as follows:
Pij + Pji = Prt = LRAC or
Pji = a - b* Pij

(2)

where a and b are two positive parameters.
Following Ekelund and Thompson’s definition (2001) of
competitive equilibrium of Adam Smith’s joint products, there
are two main contents in Eq. (2). First, Pij and Pji are to sum up
to cover some constant cost in order to fulfill the condition of
competitive equilibrium, because competition drives economic
profit to zero. That is, as in a competitive market, the sum of
two freight rates (Pij + Pji) equals total cost. Statistically, the

(in unit of million TEUs)
Transatlantic
Europe/
North America/
North America
Europe
1.68
1.69
1.71
1.60
2.06
1.72
2.35
1.66
2.42
1.50
2.70
1.71
2.58
1.55
2.63
1.43
3.03
1.64
3.53
1.88
3.72
1.99
3.74
2.05
3.51
2.41
3.39
2.62
2.74
2.05
3.10
2.80
3.40
2.80

value of constant term (a) in Eq. (1) has to be a significant
positive number. Second, the value of slope of Pij is a positive
value (b) in order to fulfill the condition of joint products.
That is, two prices (Pij, Pji) move in opposite directions (Wang,
2012). Therefore, this study focuses on testing whether there
is a statistically significant positive constant term (a); and
whether the value of slope (b) is a significant positive value or
equal to 1 (Wang, 2012).

IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
According to Review of Maritime Transport (2011-2012),
the balance of 2.4 billion tones of dry cargoes is made up of
containerized (56 per cent) and general cargoes. Driven by the
increasing international division of labor and productivity
gains within the sector, container trade, the fastest-growing
cargo segment expanded at an average rate of 8.2 per cent
between 1990 and 2010. Table 1 features container trade
volumes on the three major East-West container routes from
1995 to 2011. Over this period, the continuing expansion in
container trade volume is compelling, as is the drastic drop in
volumes recorded in 2009. Growth in container trade volumes
was propelled by the double-digit rates involving Asia, namely
Far East/North America and Far East /Europe.
The three major trade lanes around the world are Far East/
North America, Far East/Europe and North America/Europe;
and among them, the latter two are related to the Europe
market. Traditionally, consumer goods from Europe moving
to the North America comprised the head haul direction of the
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Table 2. World liner data all-in monthly freight rate changes compared with average rate in each trade lane for 2008.
Month/Year
Far East/ Europe
Europe/Far East
07/2010
119
116
08/2010
119
112
09/2010
113
106
10/2010
108
103
11/2010
102
100
12/2010
95
93
01/2011
93
89
02/2011
91
84
03/2011
85
85
04/2011
80
85
05/2011
78
85
06/2011
77
84
07/2011
74
82
08/2011
76
79
09/2011
76
77
10/2011
75
73
11/2011
77
69
12/2011
75
64
01/2012
65
70
02/2012
64
71
03/2012
83
77
04/2012
99
88
05/2012
104
99
06/2012
101
104
07/2012
100
104
08/2012
95
102
09/2012
87
101
10/2012
79
98
11/2012
79
100
12/2012
99
99
Source: Containerisation International online 2013.

trade, meaning the direction of the trade with the greatest
quantity of cargo that usually generates the highest revenue
(FMC, 2012). Similarly, consumer goods from Far East to
Europe also comprised the head haul direction of the trade.
According to Table 1, in year 1995, the shipment ratio in
terms of TEU between North America and Europe head haul
and backhaul shipment was roughly equal to (H/B = 1.68/1.69 =
1.00) 1.00. The trade ratio rose sharply after 1996, and reached
1.88 in 2004. In 2006, head haul and backhaul shipment ratio
dropped substantially and reached the low point of (H/B =
3.10/2.80 = 1.11) 1.11 in 2010. The ratio rose slightly to 1.21 in
2011. In contrast, the shipment ratio in terms of TEU between
Far East and Europe head haul and backhaul shipment was low
(H/B = 2.40/2.02 =1.19) in 1995. The trade imbalance between
head haul and backhaul rose sharply after 1996, and reached the
record high of (H/B = 12.98/4.97 = 2.61) 2.61 in 2007. The
ratio dropped slightly after 2008 and fell to 2.27 in 2011.
Substantial trade imbalance existed in Europe-based trade
lanes creates a situation of excess shipping capacity with too

North America/ Europe
106
107
108
108
107
107
107
106
105
107
110
110
110
109
109
108
107
105
103
103
103
104
103
103
103
100
100
99
98
97

Europe/North America
85
83
85
86
87
88
87
88
87
88
88
89
89
89
88
88
88
89
91
89
89
90
91
91
91
90
90
92
92
91

many slots chasing too few containers in the backhaul container
shipment. After the repeal of conference, the existence of excess capacity in the backhaul shipments will ensure that carriers
adopt an efficient pricing policy to fill their empty slots.
Table 2 presents the development of liner freight rates on
cargoes loaded or discharged by liners in Europe for the
period of July 2010 – December 2012. The data history of
Far East/Europe and Europe/Far East in Table 2 shows a tendency for the two freight rate indices to move in the same
direction during the period of study. Examining these timeseries data reveals that the correlation coefficient is equal to
0.841 for this period, implying that both head haul and backhaul indices move in the same direction. In contrast, the data
of North America/Europe and Europe/North America show
that as the head haul freight rates fluctuate, the backhaul
freight rates move in the opposite direction to maintain the
competitive equilibrium. Statistical examination for these two
freight rate data shows that the value of correlation coefficient
equals -0.534, thus confirming the conjecture that North
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Table 3. Result of regression analysis for backhaul freight
rate indices.

All-in Freight Rate Index

150
100
50

Far East/Europe Westbound
Far East/Europe Eastbound

07
/2
01
0
11
/2
01
0
03
/2
01
1
07
/2
01
1
11
/2
01
1
03
/2
01
2
07
/2
01
2
11
/2
01
2

0

Month/Year
Source: Containerisation International online 2013.
Fig. 3. Far East/Europe freight rate index.

100

Index

North America/Europe
variables
b
s. e.
Constant
195.978***
21.950
Pij
-1.024***
0.247
2
0.3798
R
0.3577
Adj-R2
17.151***
F
N
30
*** P < 0.001

Far East/Europe
b
s. e.
30.957***
7.143
0.682***
0.080
0.7196
0.7096
71.891***
30

In order to investigate the structural change after the repeal
of conference after 2009, the sample runs from July 2010 to
December 2012. OLS test has been applied to the price series
of both trade lanes and results are shown on Table 3.
For the North America/Europe trade lane, the empirical
result of estimation by OLS is as follows:

All-in Freight Rate Index

120

141

80
60
40

North America/Europe Westbound
North America/Europe Eastbound

20

Pji = 195.978 – 1.024* Pij

(3)

America/Europe head haul and backhaul indices move in
opposite direction. Figs. 3 and 4 show the trends of two freight
rate indices.
To examine the existence of a positive constant term (a) and
an inverse relationship between the freight rates of head haul
and backhaul container shipments in Europe, we examine the
linear Eq. (2) as follows:

By comparing Eqs. (1) and (2), we know that Eq. (1) is a
stricter test than Eq. (2). So long as we can empirically confirm the result of Eq. (1), we can also confirm the result of Eq.
(2). According to the result of our empirical study (Eq. (3)),
we can conclude that both linear and nonlinear conditions are
fulfilled.
Following the above estimation, the null hypothesis (H0:
both constant term (a) and slope (b) are positive) cannot be rejected because the empirical test shows that the data are consistent with the null hypothesis for the North America/Europe
trade lane. The above empirical result confirms our main
hypothesis that the North America/Europe trade lane is competitive after the repeal of conference.
In contrast, for the Far East/Europe trade lane, the empirical
result of estimation by OLS is as follows:

Pji = a - b* Pij

Pji = 30.958 - (- 0.682)* Pij

where the constant term (a) is the value of LRAC, the long-run
average cost of providing the head haul and backhaul service,
while Pij and Pji are the head haul and backhaul freight rate
indices, respectively. To examine whether the liner market is
competitive, our statistical test focuses on estimating the value
of the constant term (a). That is, Pij and Pji are to sum up to
cover some constant cost in order to fulfill the condition of
competitive equilibrium. Moreover, we are also interested in
how the movement of Pij affects the movement of Pji, the parameter (b) of the above equation is designed to be positive to
reflect the opposite relationship between Pij and Pji. Statistically, we can conduct the following hypothesis test:

The null hypothesis (i.e., H0: both constant term (a) and
slope (b) are positive) is rejected. This empirical result reflects the fact that competition is not completely free in the Far
East/Europe trade lane. The increasingly larger ships plying
the Far East/Europe trade route seem to be the main reason
contributing to this non-competitive market structure. For instance, for an Asia-Europe string, 12 ships of at least 12,000
TEUs are needed and that is an outlay of at least $1.4 billion.
“But to be competitive, at least three strings are needed, raising
this investment level to $4.2 billion.” (American Shipper,
2012a)
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Fig. 4. North America/Europe freight rate index.

H0: both constant term (a) and slope (b) are positive.
H1: both constant term (a) and slope (b) are non-positive.

(4)

V. CONCLUSIONS
By the end of June 2008, TACA and FEFC terminated its
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tariff and discontinued operating as a conference. Meanwhile,
the occurrence of recession in the USA and North Europe
began to unfold, coinciding with the repeal of conference in
Oct. 2008. The growth of world container trade was cut down.
At the time, no one can know for certain what the impact of the
repeal of liner conferences in the EU will be. However, one
can reasonably expect that some form of market restructuring
in the liner sector over the medium term as well as impetus to
new business models and innovation.
Theoretically, the end of carrier conferences to and from
Europe heralds a new era for shipping and trade liberalization.
Shipping deregulation helps provide an essential framework
that encourages market discipline and eliminates anticompetitive behavior. Our main hypothesis that the liner shipping
market is competitive after the repeal of conference is confirmed by the empirical result of the North America/Europe
trade route.
This study described the repeal of conference as the prime
reason for the major structural change in the Europe liner
shipping industry. However, further research is still needed
to assess the robustness of these preliminary conclusions.
Meanwhile, there are some other variables that might probably
affect the shipping freight rates, such as Bunker Adjustment
Factor (BAFs), could be considered in the further research of
this field. The authors of this paper also suggest that the
Smith’s condition of joint products can further be applied to
airline and road transport industries to assess the impact of
deregulation.
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